Structured CDs Are Not For Everyone, Or Maybe Anyone, And Almost Certainly Not You

The Wall Street Journal does a good job of explaining why investors should steer clear of "Structured CDs" and anyone who tries to foist them on customers. The truth is, they're unlike traditional CDs that savers and investors have relied on for years. They're riskier, more complicated, and as often as not perform worse than regular CDs:

Of the 325 Barclays CDs reviewed by the Journal, 239 had announced at least one annual return payment. More than half of those returns were lower than an investor would have earned from an average five-year conventional CD. Of the 118 structured CDs that were issued at least three years ago, only one-quarter posted returns better than those of an average five-year conventional CD. And roughly one-quarter produced no returns at all as of June 2016.

On the other hand, if you're looking to pay high fees to get a product that you won't understand, comes with a 200 page prospectus filled with calculus and legalese, and that will likely earn less than a plain vanilla CD, then by all means, go with a structured product.

Investor Should Beware Of Back-Tested Results In Marketing Materials

The New York Times provides an example of why investors should not trust strategies that are advertised as successful based on hypothetical returns in prior periods. The example comes from Spruce Alpha, a hedge fund run by Spruce Investment Advisors, which specializes in managing money for the wealthy and institutional investors like the Hamlin School, a private all-girls school in San Francisco, family offices, corporations and pension plans. Spruce "pitched large returns in periods of market turbulence" and emphasized in its marketing materials that the strategy would have generated "outsize[d] hypothetical performance going back as far as 2006." Despite this, Spruce Alpha lost nearly half its money during the market turbulence in August 2008 by heavily relying on exchange-traded funds (E.T.F.s). While it's not clear yet exactly what caused the losses:

The back-tested results for the Spruce Alpha fund may not have taken into account how markets and investors would react given the kind of circumstances that took place in August. The hypothetical results could have underestimated the fact that some E.T.F.s are used as trading instruments that big money managers move quickly in and out of in times of extreme market volatility.

Back tested results are easily manipulated to make an untested investment strategy seem better and less risky than it actually is:

Back-tested results in hedge fund marketing materials have long drawn scorn from some in the hedge fund world. The results are typically recreated with the benefit of hindsight, making it easier for a fund to post hypothetical good results.

Norman Kilarjian, a partner with Aksia, a hedge fund advisory firm to institutional investors, said individual investors should not put great credence into back-tested results in hedge fund marketing material because the results are derived assuming optimum trading conditions.

“I’ve never seen a back-test that didn’t look fantastic, but investors are often falling for it,” he said, not commenting on any specific hedge fund.

There are two takeaways from this. First, regulators should take a hard look at how funds and advisors are using back tested results to sell their strategies to investors. Second, investors should take such hindsight analysis with many grains of salt.

SEC Proposes To Expand Discovery In Administrative Hearings

In response to criticism from banks and investment advisors, the SEC has proposed several rule changes to how it conducts administrative hearings. The proposed changes will do three things. First, they will extend the time between the initiation of the proceeding and the hearing, giving respondents more time to prepare their case. Second, they will allow respondents to take depositions. Third, they will require the parties to use electronic service for the filings of papers.

“The proposed amendments seek to modernize rules of practice for administrative proceedings, including provisions for additional time and prescribed discovery for the parties,” SEC Chairman Mary Jo White said in a statement.

It is interesting, if not particularly surprising, that the SEC has moved so quickly to respond to industry concerns regarding the limited discovery available in these proceedings. Attorneys representing claimants in FINRA arbitrations against banks have complained for years without any success about the limited discovery (including lack of depositions) in those proceedings.

The SEC's proposed rule changes are available here and the SEC's press release discussing those changes are available here.

Credit Suisse To Settle With Regulators Over Dark Pools

Credit Suisse is reportedly about to pay $80 million to the SEC and state regulators to settle claims arising out of their management of "dark pools." Dark pools are private exchanges for trading securities where large investors can undertake block trades. Because there is no transparency relating to the trades taking place in dark pools, they are susceptible to conflicts of interests by the operators of the dark pools and to predatory practices by high frequency traders.

This is not the first such settlement with and is unlikely to be the last:

The deal will be the second time in a few weeks that the SEC has set a record payout in a dark pool case. Last month, Investment Technology Group Inc. said it would pay $20.3 million for operating a proprietary trading desk that used knowledge of customers’ requests to trade for its own benefit, among other infractions. In January, UBS Group AG paid $14.4 million for lack of disclosures about how its dark pool operated.

SEC: Calling Leveraged Fixed Income Products Safe Is Fraud

Citigroup has agreed to pay $180 million to settle SEC charges related to its ASTA and MAT municipal bond funds. The advisers called the investments safe while hiding from clients the significant risks involved, according to the SEC.

Citigroup pitched the investment as a “better version of a bond” and instructed some clients to sell their unleveraged fixed-income portfolios in order to buy into the investment, according to the SEC. Internally, the private bank rated the funds as having “significant risk to principal,” while not sharing that assessment with the majority of investors and sales people, the SEC said.

Leveraging even safe investments always increases their risk and the failure to adequately inform investors of those risks and to guard against them can expose investors to significant losses and advisors to legal liability.

Settlement Of Claims Against Employers For High Fee Funds in 401(k)s

Boeing is the most recent company that employees have held to account for mismanaging its 401(K) plan. Employers offering such retirement plans have a legal obligation to ensure that its employees are not hit with excessive management fees:

If a company does right by its workers, it finds low-cost, well diversified, smart investment choices, many experts say. But Schlichter says some companies offer workers mutual funds with fees that are way too high. Sometimes, he says, the companies get kickbacks for that.

By offering high cost options in its 401(k), a company can cost its employees hundreds of thousands of dollars over the life of the investments. For example, a fee that is only one percent higher will cost employees 28% in returns over a 35-year work career. What does this mean for you?

[G]enerally, if you're paying less than 0.5 percent in fees total for your investments, you're doing well. But if you're paying more than 1 percent, you're losing a lot of money over time.

Is your company's 401(k) costing you more than it should?

Muni Bond Funds Loaded With Unrated Bonds A "Red Flag"

Municipal bond funds are often thought to be safe investments, but be careful, especially with funds stuffed full of unrated bonds:

Nuveen Investments LLC's High Yield Municipal Bond Fund has 46.9% in non-rated bonds. Waddell & Reed's Municipal High Income Fund and the firm's Ivy Municipal High Income Fund have 44.9% and 39.15%, respectively, in non-rated bonds. OppenheimerFunds' Rochester National Municipal Fund has 43% in non-rated bonds, and its Oppenheimer AMT-Free Municipals Fund has 38%.

“I would say that anything with more than 20% in non-rated bonds requires absolute confidence in the management team,” said Eric Jacobson, director of fixed-income research at Morningstar. “Anything above 40% is a red flag.”

So, what's the problem with having so much of a fund's assets tied up in unrated bonds?:

Non-rated bonds tend to be small in size and thinly traded. The average size of these issuers is $21 million, according to Municipal Market Advisers. Given the continuing headline risk in the municipal bond market, funds with such large allocations to non-rated bonds risk having to meet massive redemptions and getting stuck with having to sell these less liquid, non-rated bonds at lower prices, Mr. Jacobson said.

Another trouble with these bonds is that since they tend to be thinly traded, it can often be difficult to price them, experts said. This is a risk with all municipal bonds but even more so for non-rated bonds, said Matt Fabian, managing director at MMA.

“When you have uncertainty about what the bonds are worth and managers reporting the value on the bonds, you need to make sure they aren't exaggerating the value of the bonds,” Mr. Fabian said.

According to Investment News, here are the top-10 muni funds with the highest percentage of unrated bonds:

Invesco High Income Municipal A: 64.3%
Invesco Van Kampen High Yld Municipal A: 61.3%
Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond A: 46.9%
Waddell & Reed Muni Hi-Inc A: 44.9%
Oppenheimer Rochester National Muni A: 43.0%
Pioneer High Income Municipal A: 41.1%
Lord Abbett High Yield Municipal Bond A: 40.2%
Ivy Municipal High Income I: 39.2%
Oppenheimer AMT-Free Municipals A: 38.0%
Federated Municipal High Yield Adv F: 35.3%

It is important to note that most if not all of these funds are high yield funds. Oppenheimer's California Municipal Bond Fund, which purported to be a more conservative, capital preservation bond fund, had over 60% of its assets invested in unrated bonds as of December 31, 2008, according to Lipper.

That's one big reason that when the financial crisis hit in 2008, Oppenheimer's California Municipal Bond Fund lost over 46% of its NAV while the average loss among funds in the same Lipper Classification only lost 11% over the same time period.

At the very least, Oppenheimer should have disclosed the enormous risks that it was taking with investors' money.

Misuse of leveraged and inverse ETFs by financial advisors

Registered Rep reports that financial advisors have been misusing complex and highly risky leveraged ETFs for their unsophisticated clients:

"The problem is, while inverse/leveraged funds are appropriate for some sophisticated investors in small doses, they have been sold more aggressively in some cases. Inverse/leveraged funds are best for institutional or high-net-worth investors who want to hedge exposure and protect against short-term market issues, says David Kathman, senior mutual fund analyst with Morningstar. Allocations should be no more than about 5 percent, he added. 'Even then, I would hope they would be cautious because these types of things can turn on a dime.'”

Registered Rep notes however, that advisors have been putting up to 30% of unsophisticated clients' assets in these unsuitable vehicles. The article warns that people should "[e]xpect a wave of claims this year against financial advisors and broker/dealers who recommended certain Direxion, Rydex and ProFunds leveraged and inverse funds, last year's worst performing mutual funds, say securities attorneys."

SEC Investigating Municipal Bond Funds

According to the Bond Buyer, the SEC is investigating municipal bond funds such as Oppenheimer's California Municipal Bond Fund, which is the subject of a class action lawsuit lead by Sparer Law Group. It appears that the SEC is focusing on the same issues identified in the Oppenheimer lawsuit:

"The commission’s examiners want to know about fund holdings and to what extent they own certain debt, such as tender-option bonds and unrated securities. They want details on fund-owned munis that have defaulted. They also are asking the funds how they conduct credit analysis and how they determine the values of the municipal securities they hold, sources said."

The overlap in issues between the SEC investigation and the Oppenheimer class actions is not a coincidence. According to the author, the investigation "may have been prompted by the ongoing litigation between shareholders in seven muni funds managed by OppenheimerFunds that is pending in a federal court in Denver."

Bondholders Sue Banks to Recoup Losses on Mortgage Portfolios

In a letter written Monday, October 18, 2010, a group of institutional bond investors raised objections to the handling of 115 bond deals issued by affiliates of Countrywide Financial Corp., acquired by Bank of America Corp. in 2008. See Wall Street Journal article here. The group of institutional investors is stepping up efforts to recoup losses on soured mortgage portfolios amid concern about sloppy mortgage servicing and underwriting practices.

The group, which includes mutual-fund managers, government-related entities, insurance companies and investment partnerships, is seeking to have loans that didn't meet underwriting requirements repurchased and to be compensated for losses due to inadequate mortgage servicing.

The article notes the fact that the time to pursue some of these claims is running out. Under New York contract law, investors generally have six years from the time of a securitization to put back loans that violate representations and warranties.

Sparer Law Group continues to investigate the underwriting and mortgage servicing practices of the banks that created these mortgage pools. If you are an investor and have questions about them, please contact the firm at 415-217-7300 or info@sparerlaw.com.

About the firm:

Founded in 2003, Sparer Law Group built its reputation protecting investor rights and recovering investment losses for individuals and institutions through both individual and collective actions. The firm specializes in cases involving complex securities products including derivatives, restricted stock, hedge fund and private equity investments. In 2009, Sparer Law Group was appointed lead counsel in the consolidated securities class action against the Oppenheimer California Municipal Fund, which lost nearly $1 billion of net asset value in 2008.

FINRA Issues Investor Alert Regarding Reverse Convertibles

FINRA has issued a warning on its website to investors of Reverse Exchangeable Securities ("Reverse Convertibles").

Although often described as debt instruments, Reverse Convertibles are debt obligations of the issuer that are tied to the performance of an unrelated security or basket of securities. The Alert describes Reverse Convertibles as far more complex than a traditional bond and involve elements of options trading. In addition, Reverse Convertibles expose investors not only to risks traditionally associated with bonds and other fixed income products—such as the risk of issuer default and inflation risk—but also to the additional risks of the unrelated assets, which are often stocks.

FINRA issued the alert to inform investors of the features and risks of reverse convertibles that can be difficult for individual investors and investment professionals alike to evaluate. According to FINRA, if investors are considering purchasing Reverse Convertibles, it is critical that they look beyond the high coupon rate and focus on the risks of the underlying asset. FINRA warns ivnestors that even if the issuer of the reverse convertible is able to meet its obligations on the note—and even if the yield keeps pace with or surpasses inflation—investors could wind up, when the note matures, with shares of a depreciated—or even worthless—asset. Click here for the Full Investor Alert.

If you have suffered losses in Reverse Convertibles and would like more information, or would like to consult with an attorney on a confidential basis, contact SLG at 415-217-7300 or fill out our contact form.

SEC proposes new disclosures for target-date funds

On Wednesday June 16, 2010, Federal regulators proposed new disclosure rules for target-date retirement funds that would require sponsors to spell out how they are investing the money and to warn about risks.
Click here for entire article.

Under the SEC proposal, target-date funds' marketing materials would have to include a prominent table, chart or graph showing the allocations among the various assets over the life of the fund. A statement would have to explain that the asset allocation changes over time, and tell prospective investors that they should consider their financial situation and tolerance for risk before going into a fund.

Target-date funds came under criticism during the market meltdown of 2008 and in its aftermath. Among 31 funds with a 2010 target date, the average loss in 2008 was nearly 25 percent.

Before the vote on the proposed rules, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro stated: "It's clear that investors need more information than just the date in a fund's name."

Target Date Funds Can Be "Way Off Target"

Tom Brakke, CFA, offers new criticism today on Morningstar of Target-Date Mutual Funds, despite this investment vehicle's reputation as one of the hottest investment products of the last decade.

According to Brakke, many target date funds were structured based upon questionable assumptions about asset classes and how they perform over time. "Historical returns, the variability of those returns, and the correlations among the returns of different types of assets were used in asset allocation models as if they were facts of nature." Brakke says many target date funds with a reference date of 2010 have received much attention, "since many who held the funds on the verge of retirement saw large losses in their account balances during 2008 (with some drops exceeding 30%)." Click here for the entire article. (Subscription may be required).

In Brakke's opinion the main flaw is that deciding that someone should have X% in equities and other risky assets without regard to the valuation of those assets ignores an important relationship: The probability that stocks will perform worse than their historical average return increases as valuations rise.

Merrill's "Penalty Box"

Barry Ritholtz of the Big Picture has the interesting story of two brokers who run managed accounts at a large firm that "[r]hymes with Schmerrill." It should be a warning to all investors--brokerages compensate their brokers for investing your money, not for saving your money by pulling it out of failing investments. In fact, brokers who saved their clients' money by putting them in cash are being punished.

These two gents run a few $100 million dollars in managed accounts. They are mostly stock jockeys, but they have a smattering of bonds as well. Their assets are spread out amongst stocks they selected, in house managers, and other mangers on their firm’s platform. Typically, the clients are charged 1.0-1.25% on their assets. Various products (I hate that word) will pay the broker more or less depending upon the fund manager’s arrangements with the house.

As is typical of brokers with this size asset base and seniority, their payout was about ~43%.

Let’s do some quick math before we get to the heart of the conflict: On $300 million in assets, let’s call it $3.3 million dollars in gross revenue to the firm. That’s about $1.4 million to them, from which they pay a few sales assistants, T&E, etc. Thus, they each should be making about half million dollars annually before Uncle Sam takes his.

Here’s where things get interesting: Early in 2008, they moved aggressively into cash. (Obviously they are TBP readers). For most of the year, they run about 20% bonds, plus 5% percent stocks (some client would not sell). All told, about 75% of their asset base is in money market funds, which pays out essentially nothing to the broker — but preserves the clients investments. Late in the year, they put a toe back in the water.

Overall, the clients do very well. In a year where the markets are practically cut in half, their clients lose about 10%. The investors are ecstatic, and while the two brokers annual compensation was schmeissed — they went from over $3 million gross to under $1 million — they have happy, referral making clients to rebuild their business upon. Its a short term income hit that should generate gains over the long term. And, they got there by doing the right thing.

Now, that drop in income alone raises conflict issues. I tell clients who ask why they are paying 1% to sit in Cash that they are not — they are paying 1% to not be losing 45% in equities, and to have us tell them when to go back into stocks. We think that’s worth 1%, and if you disagree, well talk to your friends who have seen their investments destroyed.

Here’s where things get completely misaligned. When 2009 rolls around, their manager calls them into his office, and says: “Bad news, boys. Your revenues dropped so much last year you are in the Penalty Box. As per your contract, your payout for this year is 30%.”

Sparer Law Group Files Class Action Against Oppenheimer Bond Fund

The Sparer Law Group has filed the first class action lawsuit on behalf of investors who purchased the Oppenheimer California Municipal Fund (Symbols: OPCAX, OCABX, OCACX) between September 27, 2006 and November 28, 2008. The case was filed on February 4, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, case number C 09-00567 SI. See our press release here.


The lawsuit alleges that the Fund's Registration Statements and Prospectuses misled investors about the Fund's investment objectives and underlying risk by describing the Fund as seeking current income "consistent with preservation of capital." The Fund lost over 41% of its net asset value ("NAV") in 2008. By comparison, the average loss for funds within the same Lipper peer group over this period was only 11.5%.

"The promise that a municipal bond fund follows a strategy designed to preserve capital cannot be just a sales pitch. It has to be reflected in an objective investment approach," said Alan W. Sparer, lead counsel. "Investors put their 'safe' money and retirement savings in muni bonds. These funds are not the place for speculative strategies or junk bond investments."

The lawsuit alleges that the Oppenheimer California Municipal Fund policies and operations ignored the preservation of capital objective by concentrating 78% of its assets in bonds rated at the lowest investment grade or below, and concentrating 60% in bonds that were not rated by any independent rating agency. In addition, 33% of the Fund's investments were placed in Dirt Bonds, which are based on contracts for land developments that have not been built yet and were especially vulnerable to the recent declines in California's real estate market.

In addition, the lawsuit alleges that Oppenheimer failed to disclose that, because of the Fund's overconcentration in lower rated bonds and bonds that had not been rated by any independent agency, there was a significant risk that more than 25% of its assets were in junk bonds, a violation of the Fund's fundamental investment policy.

The NAV of the Oppenheimer California Municipal Fund decreased by more than $1.1 billion in 2008.

A copy of the complaint is available here.

Investors who lost money in the Oppenheimer bond funds should contact the Sparer Law Group to investigate potential avenues for recovery.

Morningstar Flunks Oppenheimer Bond Fund

Morningstar gives Oppenheimer an 'F' for failing to disclose the additional risks it had taken on in its bond funds:

""The managers bought complex, off-balance-sheet swap contracts that created a leveraging effect on the funds," Gogerty said. The managers made no attempt to tell investors that the funds were taking on additional risk, he said."

The article states that "Oppenheimer failed investors by not telling them that two of its bond funds had recently taken on extra risk." The end result was that "Oppenheimer's normally stable Champion Income and Core Bond funds saw huge losses in 2008, dropping 78% and 36% respectively."

Oregon Investigating Oppenheimer Bond Funds

Officials demand financial data from OppenheimerFunds:

Oregon State officials are investigating Oppenheimer, which managed Oregon's College Savings Network:

"The bond funds in question contributed to exorbitant losses in the network's conservative portfolios. OppenheimerFunds' Core Bond fund declined about 35 percent last year. The short-term government fund lost 6 percent last year. By comparison, a benchmark measure of its peers -- Barclays Capital U.S. 1-3 Year Government Bond Index -- gained 6.7 percent."

What Feeder Fund Managers Suspected About Madoff

It turns out that many of Madoff's feeder fund managers--the people who brought much of the money from individual investors into Madoff's Ponzi scheme--had long suspected that Madoff was engaging in illegal activity. According to Bloomberg, they just assumed that they were benefiting from the illegal activity and not being victimized by it. They thought that Madoff was using his position to "front-run" trades by his clients.

The purported mission of such feeder funds was to vet hedge funds for wealthy clients. Instead, the line between victim and perpetrator was blurred. Middlemen like Littaye funneled billions of dollars to Madoff, even, in some cases, when they suspected he was engaged in questionable trading practices. In return, they reaped hundreds of millions of dollars in client fees.

Lower Returns

Wolfer says he heard of traders trying to replicate the split-strike conversion strategy Madoff told investors he used -- buying shares of large U.S. companies and entering into options contracts to limit the risk -- and getting far lower returns. He also says he heard Littaye and other middlemen talk about how Madoff may have used the knowledge he gained from his market- making firm, New York-based Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, to get in and out of stocks ahead of market swings.

That’s front-running, a term usually applied to brokers’ trading for their own account -- and profit -- ahead of clients.

It’s also applicable to Madoff’s purported practice, says Peter Henning, a law professor at Wayne State University in Detroit and a former federal prosecutor.

“Front-running isn’t who’s getting the benefit; it’s who’s paying the price,” says Henning, noting that Madoff’s market- making customers expected the firm to obtain the best price available when buying or selling stocks. Instead, their interests were apparently subordinated to those of Madoff’s investment clients.

Front-Running

While front-running is illegal, it didn’t horrify Madoff’s champions.

“They were convinced that the risk was only that the Securities and Exchange Commission would do something about breaches of the Chinese wall in the Madoff organization,” Wolfer says. In the worst case, he says, “what could be expected was that at a certain point the SEC could say stop.”

It was obvious to anyone who looked that something fishy was going on with Madoff's trades:

"An executive at a fund of funds that invested in Kingate says he once examined Madoff’s trading records to see whether they reflected the stocks’ publicly reported activity. He found Madoff consistently bought stocks at their lows and sold them at their highs.

The executive, who wouldn’t be identified, says he reported back to his boss that he thought Madoff was front-running his clients. He says the boss’s reply was 'Yeah, so what? That’s his edge.'"

Why did the manager's of these feeder funds turn a blind eye to what appeared to be blatantly illegal activity and take such risks with their clients' money? Answer, they were raking in huge fees in return for being Madoff's willing accomplices:

"If a fund charged its clients 1 percent of the assets under management and 20 percent of the gains, as the largest one did, that translated into $41 million in annual fees.

Assuming Madoff didn’t do any investing on behalf of his clients, as investigators now suspect, the feeder funds were, in effect, being paid out of principal, which would have been depleted after 15 years.

In other words, much of the money invested in Madoff through feeder funds wound up in the pockets of fund managers."

Barry Ritholtz of the Big Picture is right in part when he says that the Trustee should "confiscate the Funds of Fund managers’ houses, cars, watches, jets and boat — as the illegal proceeds of a crime. Auction ‘em off, put the proceeds into a fund for the scam’s victims."

But the investors don't have to wait for the Trustee to act, and many are not:

"Chais’s Brighton Co.; Bank Medici, which was taken over by Austrian regulators; Fairfield Greenwich; Merkin’s funds; and Tremont have all been sued by investors claiming the firms should have known better than to invest with Madoff."

Target Date Mutual Funds Riskier Than Thought

Poor performance this year of Target Date Mutual Funds has left many investors asking questions about their holdings. Target date funds - also known as a lifecycle or age-based funds - are designed to take decision making out of an investor's hands when it comes to figuring out how to invest for retirement. The idea is you simply put your money into a single fund linked to the approximate year in which you plan to retire. Fund companies say they'll do the rest. The funds are supposed become more conservative as the target date approaches. But many with a target date of 2010 (less than a year away) have been reeling in the market with losses ranging from 15 percent to more than 40 percent to date, according to Barbara Whelehan. Click here for full article. Some funds may have had exposure to high risk bond holdings, CMBS, Swaps and toxic derivatives. According to SmartMoney, Target-date funds are trickier to evaluate than standard mutual funds, carry unique risks, and their lack of transparency is a big problem.

Investors holding funds with a date of 2010 or 2015 with large losses should feel free to contact Sparer Law Group to discuss their investment holdings.

Did Municipalities Overpay For Swaps and Swaptions?

The S.E.C., the Justice Department, and various states' Attorneys General are investigating what may be "one of the longest-running, most economically pervasive antitrust conspiracies ever to be uncovered in the U.S."

Three federal agencies and a loose consortium of state attorneys general have for several years been gathering evidence of what appears to be collusion among the banks and other companies that have helped state and local governments take approximately $400 billion worth of municipal notes and bonds to market each year.

E-mail messages, taped phone conversations and other court documents suggest that companies did not engage in open competition for this lucrative business, but secretly divided it among themselves, imposing layers of excess cost on local governments, violating the federal rules for tax-exempt bonds and making questionable payments and campaign contributions to local officials who could steer them business. In some cases, they created exotic financial structures that blew up.

People with knowledge of the evidence say investigators are not just looking at a few bad apples, but also at the way an entire market has operated for years (emphasis added).

Banks have exacerbated the damage to many municipalities by selling them unnecessary interest rate swaps that have driven some cities and counties to the verge of bankruptcy:

The use of derivatives in connection with municipal bonds has grown rapidly in the last five years. The packages are presented as money-savers to the municipalities, which may want to protect themselves against interest rate changes. But over the last year, as turmoil spread through the credit markets, some of the derivatives have blown up, leaving local governments stuck with unexpected costs.

That happened in Alabama, where Jefferson County linked an extraordinary number of derivatives, called interest-rate swaps, to its bonds, in some cases with the help of CDR Financial. Despite publicized concerns about whether improper payments to certain officials were behind the swaps, the county insisted the swaps were saving money. Last year, the derivatives failed, leaving the county with vast bills. Jefferson County is now at risk of declaring what would be the biggest governmental bankruptcy in United States history.

Even in places where the bonds and derivatives are performing as expected, irate government officials are finding they may have overpaid for various services and have inadvertently broken federal tax rules. Again and again, proceeds from tax-exempt bonds appear to have improperly generated investment income for banks and insurers.

Among the governments that have sued these financial firms are the cities of Chicago and Baltimore; Oakland and Fresno, Calif.; the state of Mississippi; and a number of counties, school districts and at least one water and sewer district. The lawsuits were consolidated in November, in Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York (emphasis added).

Municipalities should examine prior bond offerings and interest rate swap purchases very carefully to see if they have been victimized by this scam.